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Abstract
The IoT is a wonderful concept in continuous evolution; in my
thesis work I first introduced the key concepts on which my
work is based, like privacy and security. In the second chapter I
present an overview of the IoT state of art updated at April 2015,
knowing that one day to another there is the chance to discover
new concepts and revolutionize all the old thinking. In the third
chapter I explained the theoretical background,necessary to un-
derstand the different components of the cryptosystem proposed
in my work. In the fourth chapter I described briefly which sce-
narios my application can fit (with a short description of what
a Mobile Ad-hoc Network is) and explained my thesis work in
depth, presenting the project part and the implementation one,
and analyzing the results obtained by simulations on the test bed.
At the end I drew some concluding remarks on my work.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Security is always excessive until it’s not enough.”
Robbie Sinclair
With the advent of new technologies, social networks and
portable devices with Internet access, people’s privacy protec-
tion is a key concept to be faced with. Nowadays people don’t
understand how many personal information they give to who-
ever knows how to move on the web. New laws and certifica-
tions are created and deployed to protect citizen’s security, but
only a better awareness of risks can really protect the “medium”
user. Therefore, it is essential to let the people know those kinds
of risks and to protect them in order to avoid facing problems
the hard way. Portable objects have made possible the realiza-
tion of the Internet of Things, literally an environment where
every little object has a possibility to communicate his data elec-
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tronically and can build a net with his counterparts to improve
or simply to facilitate people’s life, at the cost of their own pri-
vacy. My application wants to give a possible solution in order
to make people able to communicate in an environment with
constrained resources, in the safest, fastest and most efficient
way that I know, but the awareness of an imminent attack is al-
ways the best weapon in the user’s hands.
Chapter 2
Internet of Things
2.1 The Internet of Things
The Internet of Things is an emerging global Internet-based tech-
nical architecture facilitating the exchange of goods and services
in global supply chain networks. With the exchange of an in-
credible amount of information, it has an huge impact on the
security and privacy of the involved stakeholders.
To analize all the problematics involved with this architecture,
we must highlight the fact that being a fusion of heterogeneous
networks, it brings with himself the problematics of old tech-
nologies on which it sets up, like Internet, sensor networks and
mobile communication networks. Furthermore it has to take
into account the new problems growing with the IoT architec-
ture itself, like heterogeneous network authentication, informa-
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tion store and management, access control and last but not least
privacy protection.
By the fact that actually doesn’t exist an official and unificated
IoT Architecture, in this thesis work we’ll use a 3-layered struc-
ture [29], evidenced in Figure 2.1.
Fig. 2.1 Three layered structure of Internet of Things
Analyzing this scheme we can see that we divide the IoT Ar-
chitecture in: Perception Layer, Network Layer and Application
Layer, from bottom to top. The first one groups all the phys-
ical resources needed to gather data (sensors, RFID etc); the
second one represents the classical network layer as intended in
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ISO/OSI stack. The last one groups all the applications and ser-
vices needed to the users to use the IoT infrastructure.
2.2 Security overview
As we can see from Figure 2.1, for every layer, we must en-
sure Information, Physical and Management Security. We can
ensure these characteristics by focusing on 3 security concepts:
Comprehensive Perception, Reliable Transmission and Intelli-
gent Processing. The first one means that every sensor of the
Perception Layer is used in a way that allows to gather data
anytime and anywhere. Reliable Transmission means that the
transmission of data must be pursued in the most efficient and
secure way, through the wired or wireless network, to the data
center, in real time. Intelligent Processing means that we can
do middle-ware analysis to deal in the best way with collected
information, to save resources before submitting data to the Ap-
plication Layer.
In order to obtain the maximal level of security and privacy
preservation, it’s possible to use the above mentioned charac-
teristics to point out the security problems in the IoT environ-
ment. The first three are traditional security features, the others
are new ones [29].
1) The security problems of Perception layer data collection and
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transmission: Sensor nodes have a high heterogeneity. They
generally have simple structures and processors. These charac-
teristics make the security protection complex.
2) The traditional security issues of Network Layer: Although
Internet security architecture is very mature, there are still many
kind of attacks. For example a large number of malicious nodes
sending data at the same time will lead to a DoS attack. So the
specific network should be built in order to fit transmission of
IoT information
3) The Application Layer security problems: For different ap-
plication fields, there are many complex and varied security is-
sues.
4) The contradiction between Security and Costs: If each sen-
sor node cost is too low, the large number of low performance
nodes will reduce the overall security of the sensor network. On
other hand, high performance nodes can increase security, but
the cost of network maintenance will rise.
5) Lightweight: The processor performance of sensor nodes is
limited, so there is a need for lightweight security authentication
and encryption algorithms
6) Asymmetric: Compared with network terminals, gateway
nodes data processing ability is weak, for this reason it’s im-
portant to handle these asymmetric networks in the best way to
be coordinated and to grant efficient security management mea-
sures.
7) Complexity: The type of applications determine the number
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of security issues and their complexity. The security problem of
each layer should be considered synthetically.
As mentioned above those problems are numerous and complex,
therefore it’s fundamental to understand all kinds of security is-
sues of each layer, and potential attacks. Considered the system
as a whole, the security problems should be solved at the begin-
ning of the design. Therefore, literature [10] raises the appli-
cation for the security state assessment about IoT based on grey
correlation algorithm, which put several common attacks as the
security factor, to realize quantitative evaluation of the entire
network about environment and status. It also lists the specific
steps to apply this algorithm to the security state evaluation. In
the following sections there will be an evaluation of the security
problems in each layer.
2.2.1 Perception Layer security problems
The main equipment in perception layer includes RFID, ZigBee,
and all kind of sensors. When data are collected, the way to
transmit information is wireless network transmission. The sig-
nals are usually public exposed, and if the network lacks of ef-
fective protection measures, they will be monitored, intercepted
and disturbed easily. The most of sensing devices are deployed
in unmanned monitoring sites, so the attackers can easily gain
access to the equipment, controlling or physical tampering them.
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For instance Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a very effec-
tive attack.
Several kind of attacks are the following [15]:
1) Node Capture: Key nodes, such as gateway nodes, are easily
controlled by the attackers. It may bring to information leaks,
including group communication key, radio key, matching key
etc, and then threats the security of the entire network.
2) Fake Node and Malicious Data: The attackers add a node to
the system and input fake code or data through it. It will oc-
casionally lead to stop the transmission of real data, but more
important, the energy saving of mobile nodes is denied, leading
to control or destruction of the entire network.
3) Denial of Service Attack: DoS attack is the most common
attack in WSN and Internet. It causes loss of network resources
and makes the service unavailable.
4) Timing Attack: By analyzing the time required for executing
encryption algorithm the attacker can obtain key information.
5) Routing Threats: Through cheat, tamper or resend routing in-
formation, the attacker can create routing loops, cause or resist
network transmission, extend or shorten the source path, form
the error messages, increase the end-to-end delay, etc.
6) Replay Attack: Attacker sends a package which has been re-
ceived by the destination host, in order to obtain the trust of the
system. It’s mainly used in the authentication process, destroy-
ing the validity of certification.
7) Side Channel Attack (SCA): The opponent attacks encryp-
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tion devices through the information leakage in the side chan-
nel, such as time consumption, power consumption or electro-
magnetic radiations.
8) Mass Node Authentication Problem: The efficiency of mass
node authentication needs to be solved in IoT. My thesis work
is a proposal to solve this problem.
In addition, by the fact that mobile intelligent terminals will be
an important part of IoT perception layer, their security can’t be
ignored. For example, most of smartphones have security bugs,
combined with some of the features like phone memory scan-
ning, address uploading and positioning, can lead attackers to
threat the users’ privacy. Therefore privacy protection is a key
concept to address.
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Wireless Sensor Networks security attacks
Wireless sensor networks [20] are a subclass of wireless net-
works in general, so most kinds of attacks that can be directed
at wireless networks can be directed at WSN. However, due to
additional challenges, WSN breed a whole new set of attacks
that can be classified into “mote-class attacks” and “laptop-class
attacks”. In a mote-class attack, the attacker takes control of a
few compromised nodes and has capacity no greater than that
of these ordinary sensor nodes. Hence, he has to launch at-
tacks without depleting his resources (storage, computation, and
bandwidth). Moreover, the attacker is restricted in his coverage
due to limited transmission power. In contrast, the laptop-class
attacker is resource-abundant (high transmitting power, longer
battery life, high-speed processors, and highly receptive omni-
directional antennae). Hence, he has greater coverage and di-
versity in terms of the attacks that he can launch. Figure 2.2
portrays the attack taxonomy for WSN, while Table 2.1 shows
the attack classification through a layered approach. In general,
attacks can be divided into active and passive attacks.
• Passive attack: In this type of attack, the attacker is able
to intercept and monitor data between communicating nodes,
but does not tamper or modify packets for fear of raising
suspicion of malicious activity among the nodes. For ex-
ample, in traffic analysis, the attacker may not be able
to decode encrypted data, but can find useful informa-
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tion by analyzing headers of packets, their sizes, and the
frequency of transmission. In WSN, reconnaissance can
also be performed to understand information exchange be-
tween communicating nodes, particularly at data aggre-
gation points. Furthermore, routing information can be
exploited using traffic analysis.
• Active attack: In this type of attack, the attacker actively
participates in all forms of communication (control and
data) and may modify, delete, reorder, and replay mes-
sages or even send spoofed illicit messages to nodes in the
network. Some other active attacks include node captur-
ing, tampering with routing information, and resource ex-
haustion attacks. Peculiar to WSN, the attacker can mod-
ify the environment surrounding sensors, which could af-
fect the sensed phenomena.
2.2.2 Network Layer security problems
1) Traditional Security Problems: General security problems
in communication networks will pose a threat to data confi-
dentiality and integrity. Although the existing communication
networks have relatively complete security protection measures,
there are still some common threats, including illegal access
to networks, eavesdropping information, confidentiality dam-
age, integrity damage, DoS attacks, Man-in-the-Middle attacks,
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Table 2.1 Attack classification using a layered approach
Layer Attack Vectors
Application Data corruption and repudiation
Transport Session hijacking and SYN flooding
IP layer Byzantine, resource consumption,
location disclosure, wormhole
and black hole
Data link Traffic analysis
Physical Interference and jamming
Multilayer attack DoS, replay, man-in-the-middle and replay
virus invasion, exploit attacks, etc
2) Compatibility problems: The existing Internet network secu-
rity architecture is designed on a person’s perspective. This de-
sign doesn’t necessarily apply to machine communication. Us-
ing the existing security mechanisms will lead to split the logic
relationship between IoT machines. Therefore, by the fact that
access networks have multiple access methods, the heterogene-
ity of these networks makes security, interoperability and coor-
dination of networks becoming worse, leading to security vul-
nerabilities.
3) The Cluster Security Problems: Including network conges-
tion, DoS attacks, authentication problems, etc. By the fact IoT
is designed with the goal of using a huge number of devices, the
uses of the existing modes of authentication for all of its devices
will cause a large amount of data flowing through the network,
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likely causing its block. Moreover the existing IP technology
does not apply to a large number of node identification. The
mutual authentication among a lot of equipment causes serious
waste of key resources.
4) Privacy Disclosure: With the development of the informa-
tion retrieval technology and social engineering, hackers can
easily collect a large number of particular users’ privacy infor-
mation.
2.2.3 Application Layer security problems
Depending on the application environment, the Application Lay-
ers are completely different, leading to various security issues.
Nowadays there isn’t an universal standard for the construction
of IoT applications, some enterprises carry out M2M (machine-
to-machine) mode IoT, such as intelligent community, intelli-
gent household, medical, etc, which has some solutions devel-
oped on a 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low power WPAN) archi-
tecture, like medical sensory systems. Although application
layer security is more complex and burdensome, it can still be
summed up to some common security problems:
1) Data Access Permissions, Identity Authentication: Different
applications have different users, likely a large amount of them.
In order to prevent the illegal user intervention, the administra-
tor should use effective authentication technology. Spam and
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malicious information identification and processing should also
be considered.
2) Data Protection and Recovery: Data communication involve
user’s privacy. Data protection mechanisms and data process-
ing algorithms are not perfect, and they may cause data loss and
even catastrophic damage. The mass node management is also
one reason.
3) The ability of Dealing with Mass-Data: Due to the large num-
ber of nodes, we have to face the problem of huge amounts of
data transmission in a very complex network environment. This
can lead to network interruptions and data losses once the data
processing ability can’t meet the requirements.
4) The Application Layer Software Vulnerabilities: When writ-
ing software, because programmers write non-standard codes,
occasionally buffer overflows vulnerabilities exist in the soft-
ware, etc. Hackers can use those exploits to carry their purpose.
2.3 Security measures
As a Multi-layer fusion network, IoT security involves different
layers in IoT. There are lots of security technologies applied in
these independent networks, especially in the mobile communi-
cation network and the Internet network. For sensor networks
in IoT, the diversity of the resources involved and the network
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heterogeneity make security research very complicated. This
section will introduce the security measures for each layer.
2.3.1 Perception Layer security measures
Because RFID and WSN are a fundamental part of IoT Per-
ception layer, their security measures will be introduced respec-
tively.
1) RFID security measures [14]:
1. Access Control: It’s used mainly in order to prevent the
user’s privacy leaks, to protect against free reading of the
sensible information contained in the RFID tags, like la-
bel failure, chip protection, antenna energy analysis. The
implementation of Access Control on RFID tags can be
done easily in high-end tags, while on low-cost tags can
be a little tricky. A good solution about Access Control
on low-cost tags is presented in [12], which implements
a Selective RFID Jamming.
• Passports [18]: In the United States was introduced
the idea of using RFID tags inside passports to con-
tain personal information of citizens like document
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ID, digital photos and biometric data (like the finger-
prints or iris images). The protocol used in first im-
plementation is BAC (Basic Access Control), which
has been proved to be vulnerable to passive skim-
ming and bruteforce, so a second protocol has been
standardized: EAC (Extended Access Control) but
yet not utilized.
• Proximity Cards: Used to grant access control to a
determined class of workers inside a company. In
this way the worker has just the privileges he needs
to develop his job, and the required protection of his
own personal data contained inside the tag (entry and
exit time, transfers and so on) which could be used
by an opponent, if not correctly protected. There are
a lot of protocols which implements Access Control
on RFID tags, one of them is illustrated in [4].
• Automobile Ignition Keys: In this case access control
is used to bind a determined key to his own car, to
avoid car theft through physical duplication of the
key. Indeed the first authentication happens at the
door opening, the tag transmit the ID code to the
control unit, which enables the opening only if the
ID code is correct. The same procedure happens at
the car ignition. In this case the utilized protocols
belong to the manufacturers.
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• Credit Cards: Most updated bank circuits (Visa, Mas-
tercard and American Express) introduced contact-
less version of their own credit cards. Access con-
trol in this case is required to not pass information
just by standing near an RF reader. For this purpose
containers like Faraday cage are used. Obviously
protocols for Access Control are owned by manu-
facturers and kept secret.
2. Data Encryption: To grant data security of the RFID sys-
tem, it’s compulsory to encrypt the RFID signal using the
appropriate algorithm. Literature [28] puts forward a kind
of nonlinear key algorithm based on the displaced calcula-
tion, and achieves RFID system data encryption. To guar-
antee the condition of high speed data transmission, this
key algorithm uses little computing power, still achieving
very high security.
• Pharmaceutical Applications: In the Pharmaceuti-
cal world, Data encryption is fundamental. Appli-
cations like drug tracing and e-pedigrees are used to
recognize forged products, and obviously those data
need to be protected to keep the supply chain pro-
tected from frauds. Another application which re-
quire strong data encryption is the Smart Labelling,
indeed, smart labels contain patients health data which
can be used to hurt their lives.
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• SpeedPass: The SpeedPass is a contactless payment
solution used in the United States to pay for example
at gas stations or to stores which support this kind of
payment. In this case Data Encryption is essential to
protect bank data passing from SpeedPass to reader.
• Smart Metering: Any information about the electri-
cal consume of a family, contains a lot of informa-
tion about the family itself and the activity carried
out inside an habitation. For this reason, it is com-
pulsory to encrypt this kind of data.
• Logistics: Trough RFID sensors it’s possible to keep
track of goods, for example, inside a warehouse. For
this reason is important to encrypt data regarding
goods, to avoid an opponent to know if at a given
time there will be the required quantity of items to
be stolen.
3. Security Channel based on IPSec: IPSec protocol suite
provides two types of security mechanisms: authentica-
tion and encryption. The receiver of IP communication
data is able to confirm the sender’s real identity trough
authentication mechanism. Data encryption mechanisms,
instead, prevent attackers to eavesdrop and tamper data
during transmission, and encode data for ensure data con-
fidentiality.
20 Internet of Things
4. Cryptography Technology Scheme: Cryptography tech-
nology not only can realize the user privacy protection, it
can also protect confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
of RFID system. Secure communication protocols in-
clude random number generation, hash functions, server
data search, and re-encryption mechanisms.
5. Physical Security Scheme: SCA is a major problem in
physical security. The Differential Power Analysis is a
common means of SCA. The various strategies adopted
to prevent DPA can be divided into two categories: hiding
and masking.The first one eliminates data dependencies of
the energy consumption; masking makes the intermediate
values of the encryption devices to be randomized in the
process.
2) WSN security measures [20]:
As attacks on WSN become more sophisticated, the demand for
new security solutions is continually increasing. Hence, an array
of new security schemes have been designed and implemented
in the past decade [9], [21]. Most of these schemes have been
designed to provide solutions on a layer-by-layer basis rather
than on a per-attack basis; in doing so, they have left a gap be-
tween layers that may lead to cross-layer attacks. In general, any
security suite should ensure authentication, integrity, confiden-
tiality, availability, access control, and nonrepudiation. In ad-
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dition, physical safety is absolutely necessary to avoid tamper-
ing or destruction of nodes. Therefore, construction of tamper-
resistant sensor nodes is absolutely necessary. However, such
tamper-resistant schemes come at a higher manufacturing cost
and are restricted to applications that are not only critical but
that use fewer nodes.
• Authentication: The main objective of authentication is to
prevent impersonation attacks. Hence, authentication can
be defined as the process of assuring that the identity of
the communicating entity is what it claims to
• Integrity: The goal of integrity is to affirm that the data
received are not altered by an interceptor during commu-
nication (by insertion, deletion, or replay of data) and is
exactly as it was sent by the authorized sender. Usually,
cryptographic methods such as digital signatures and hash
values are used to provide data integrity.
• Confidentiality: The goal of confidentiality is to protect
the data from unauthorized disclosure. A common ap-
proach to achieve confidentiality is by encrypting user data.
• Availability: The goal of availability is to ensure that the
system (network) resources are available and usable by
an authorized entity, upon its request. It tries to achieve
survivability of the network at all times.
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• Access control: The goal of access control is to enforce
access rights to all resources in its system. It tries to pre-
vent unauthorized use of system and network resources.
Access control is closely related to authentication attributes.
It plays a major role in preventing leakage of informa-
tion during a node compromise attack. One of the con-
ventional approaches to access control is to use thresh-
old cryptography. This approach hides data by splitting
them into a number of shares. To retrieve the final data,
each share should be received through an authenticated
process.
• Nonrepudiation: Nonrepudiation can be best explained
with an example. Let Alice and Bob be two nodes, who
wish to communicate with each other. Let Alice send a
message (M) to Bob. Later, Alice claims that she did not
send any message to Bob. Hence, the question that arises
is how Bob should be protected if Alice denies any in-
volvement in any form of communication with Bob. Non-
repudiation aims to achieve protection against communi-
cating entities that deny that they ever participated in any
sort of communication with the victim.
1. Security vs. Privacy Attacks
• Encryption Algorithm: They include both symmet-
ric and asymmetric encryption Asymmetric ones use
2.3 Security measures 23
mainly RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) and ECC (El-
liptic Curves Cryptography). Most common sym-
metric algorithms instead are Skipjack and RC5. By
the fact that nodes processing ability is poor, sym-
metric algorithms are the most common to be used
in WSN.
2. Security vs. Control Attacks
• Key Management: The design of security require-
ments of WSN key management mainly reflects in
the security of key generation or update algorithm,
forward privacy, backward privacy and extensibil-
ity, against collusion attacks, source authentication
and freshness. There are four main key distribution
protocols: simple key distribution protocol, key pre-
distribution agreement, dynamic key management pro-
tocol and hierarchical key management protocol.
• Authentication and Access Control: Authentication
techniques mainly include lightweight public key au-
thentication technology, PSK (Pre Shared Key), ran-
dom key pre-distribution authentication technology,
auxiliary information authentication technology, one
way hash functions authentication technology, etc.
Access control mainly includes asymmetric cryptosys-
tems and symmetric cryptosystems.
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• Intrusion Detection Technology: IDS (Intrusion De-
tection System) can monitor the behavior of network
nodes timely and find suspicious behavior of nodes.
3. Security vs. Availability Attacks
• Secure Routing Protocol: An efficient security rout-
ing protocol algorithm generally uses the following
mechanisms: clustering, data fusion, multiple hops
routing mechanism, key mechanism, etc. SPINS se-
curity framework [22] is widely used in security
routing technology, including SNEP (Secure Network
Encryption Protocol) and µTESLA (Micro Timed
Efficient Streaming Loss-tolerant Authentication pro-
tocol). SNEP is used to implement confidentiality,
integrity, freshness and point-to-point authentication.
µTESLA is an efficient flow authentication protocol
based on time. It realizes point to multipoint broad-
cast authentication.
• Physical Security Design: It mainly includes node
and antennas design. Node design is developed by
hardware structure and security chip selection, chip
connection, radiofrequency circuit design, data ac-
quisition unit design. Antenna design should meet
good communication distance, high adaptability, sta-
bility, etc.
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Security in WSN using a Layered Approach
1. Security measures in Physical Layer: To prevent ra-
dio interference or jamming, the two common techniques
used are frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) and
direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS). In FHSS, the
signal is modulated at frequencies such that it hops from
one frequency to another in a random fashion at a fixed
time interval. The transmitter and the corresponding re-
ceiver hop between frequencies using the same pseudo-
random code for modulation and demodulation. If an
eavesdropper intercepts a FHSS signal, unless he has prior
knowledge of the spreading signal code, he will not be
able to demodulate the signal. Furthermore, spreading the
signal across multiple frequencies will considerably re-
duce interference. In DSSS, a spreading code is used to
map each data bit in the original signal to multiple bits in
the transmitted signal. The pseudo-random code (spread-
ing code) spreads the input data across a wider frequency
range compared to the input frequency. In the frequency
domain, the output signals appear as noise. Since the
pseudo-random code provides a wide bandwidth to the
input data, it allows the signal power to drop down be-
low the noise threshold without losing any information.
Therefore, this technique is hard for an eavesdropper to
detect, due to lower energy levels per frequency and more
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tolerance to interference. The above-mentioned schemes
can provide security only as long as the hopping pattern
or the spreading code is not disclosed to any adversary.
2. Security measures in Data Link Layer: Link-layer se-
curity plays an important role in providing hop-by-hop se-
curity. Its protocols are useful in handling fair channel
access, neighbor-node discovery, and frame error control.
To prevent denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on WSN, it is
proposed that each intermediate node in the active rout-
ing path performs an authentication and integrity check.
However, if a few intermediate nodes in the active path
have very low energy levels, and if they are forced to per-
form authentication checks, they would expend all their
energy and disrupt the active path. On the other hand, if
we look at end-to-end authentication in WSN, it is more
energy-efficient, since the sink node (resource-abundant)
is the only node that performs authentication and integrity
checks. Nevertheless, this scheme is vulnerable to many
types of security attacks (black hole, selective forward-
ing, and eavesdropping). Hence there is a need for adap-
tive schemes that consider the energy levels of each node
when deciding on the authentication schemes. Early secu-
rity approaches focused on symmetric keying techniques,
and authentication was achieved using Message Authen-
tication Code (MAC). One of the common MAC schemes
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is a cipher block chaining message authentication code.
However, this scheme is not secure for variable-length in-
put messages. Hence the end user (sensor nodes) have to
pad the input messages to be equal to a multiple of the
block cipher. Therefore, each node has to waste energy
padding input data. To overcome this issue, other block
cipher models such as CTR and OCB have been proposed.
With reference to confidentiality, symmetric encryption
schemes used to protect WSN are DES, AES, RC5, and
Skipjack (block ciphers) and RC4 (a stream cipher). Usu-
ally, block ciphers are preferred over stream ciphers be-
cause they allow authentication and encryption. A few
proposed link-layer security frameworks include TinySec,
Sensec, SNEP, MiniSec, SecureSense [13], [22] and Zig-
Bee Alliance (www.zigbee.org). However, these schemes
have limitations. For example, in Tinysec a single key is
manually programmed into all the sensor nodes in the net-
work. A simple node-capture attack on any one of these
nodes may result in the leakage of the secret key and com-
promising of the entire network. A need for a stronger
keying mechanism is needed to secure TinySec. In ad-
dition, TinySec requires padding for input messages that
are less than 8 bytes. It uses block cipher to encrypt mes-
sages, and for messages that are less than 8 by tes, the
node will have to use extra energy to pad the message be-
fore encrypting.
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WSN real life applications
There are a lot of real life applications for Wireless Sensor Net-
works in Internet of Things; here I’ll point out some of them,
but there is a whole universe of possible applications other than
those listed here.
• Smart Cities:
– Smart Parking
– Smartphone Detection
– Electromagnetic Fields Detection
– Traffic Congestion
– Smart Roads
– Waste Management
– Smart Lightning
– Noise Urban Maps
– Structural Health
• Smart Environment:
– Forest Fire Detection
– Air Pollution
– Earthquake Early Detection
– Landslide and Avalanche Detection
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– Snow Level Monitoring
• Smart Water:
– Chemical Leakage Detection in rivers
– Potable Water Monitoring
– Pollution Levels in search
– River Floods
– Water Leakages
– Swimming Pool Remote Measurement
• Smart Metering:
– Smart Metering
– Photovoltaic Installation
– Silos Stock Calculation
– Water Flow
– Tank Level
2.3.2 Network Layer security measures
In the current structure of Internet of Things, Network Layer is
the Internet or an existent communication network. There are
several factors that endanger information safety on the Internet,
and are the same factors which can pose a treat to the IoT infor-
mation service. An important fact is that the Old network isnt’
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completely adapted to IoT. The traditional routing is simple and
it’s main goal isn’t security. Because of IoT main characteristics
like random node arrangement, autonomous infrastructure, un-
reliability of energy limitation and communication, they brings
to not have a standard structure, but a dynamic topology and not
fixed infrastructure. It will all lead to an attacker who can eas-
ily cause serious damages to the IoT system. For every different
network architecture it’s needed to set up the specific authentica-
tion cohesive mechanism, the end-to-end authentication and key
agreement mechanism, PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), WPKI
for wireless, Security routing, IDS, etc. Due to the huge amount
of data, network availability have to be considered. In addition,
it’s also needed to strengthen cross-domain authentication in
network layer. Also Network Virtualization is widely used, be-
cause it greatly reduces the complexity of network management
and the possibility of wrong operations. With the development
of the Next Generation Network (NGN), being a transport layer
for IoT, the IPv6 technology has to be considered. Literature
[25] gives the development trend of IPv6-based information se-
curity protocols. Also IPv6 networks security mechanisms and
application of security products are discussed in detail.
2.3.3 Application Layer Security measures
Iot applications are very different from each other and it brings
the Application Layer to be not uniformed. Indeed different ap-
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plications have different security needs. For this reason the se-
curity approach to Application Layer is a bit different compared
to the other 2 layers, and it’s divided in two different solutions:
Technical and Non-Technical.
Non-Technical Solutions
1. Increasing the awareness of safety: Let users realize the
importance of information security and how to correctly
use IoT services in order to reduce the confidential infor-
mation leakage.
2. Strengthen information security management: It includes
resource management, physical security information man-
agement, password management, etc.
Technical Solutions
1. Network authentication across heterogeneous networks and
key agreement: It includes symmetric and asymmetric cryp-
tosystems and certification transfer technology.
2. Protection of private information: It includes fingerprint
technology, digital watermarking, anonymous authentica-
tion, homomorphic cryptography and threshold cryptog-
raphy, which will be discussed later in this thesis work.

Chapter 3
Privacy protection
cryptographic techniques
The Cryptographic techniques which we will examine in depth
in this chapter are: Homomorphic Encryption, Anonymous Au-
thentication and Threshold Cryptography.
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption that allows
computations to be carried out on ciphertext, thus generating an
encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches the result of
operations performed on the plaintext. This is sometimes a de-
sirable feature in modern communication system architectures.
Homomorphic encryption would allow the chaining together of
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different services without exposing the data to each of those ser-
vices, for example a chain of different services from different
companies could calculate 1) the tax 2) the currency exchange
rate 3) shipping, on a transaction without exposing the unen-
crypted data to each of those services. Homomorphic encryption
schemes are malleable by design. This enables their use in cloud
computing environment like IoT for ensuring the confidentiality
of processed data. In addition the homomorphic property of var-
ious cryptosystems can be used to create many other secure sys-
tems, for example secure voting systems [23], collision-resistant
hash functions, private information retrieval schemes, and many
more. There are several partially homomorphic cryptosystems,
and also a number of fully homomorphic cryptosystems. Al-
though a cryptosystem which is unintentionally malleable can
be subject to attacks on this basis, if treated carefully homomor-
phism can also be used to perform computations securely.
The difference between partially and fully homomorphic cryp-
tosystems is that first one allows only some operations on ci-
phertexts (e.g., additions, multiplications, quadratic functions,
etc.), while the latter allows arbitrary computation on cipher-
texts.
3.1.1 Partially homomorphic cryptosystem
As stated before, partially homomorphic cryptosystems (PHE)
allow only some operations on ciphertexts. Some of the encryp-
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tion systems used nowadays are the following: Unpadded RSA,
ElGamal, Goldwasser-Micali, Benaloh, Paillier, Okamoto-Uchiyama,
Naccache-Stern, Damgård-Jurik and Boneh-Goh-Nissin.
Some example of IoT applications which can use PHE are:
1. Protection of mobile agents: Since all conventional archi-
tectures are based on binary strings, (and they only require
addition and/or multiplication, PHE is perfect to protect
this kind of agents. 2-way approach: Encrypted functions
calculation or Encrypted data calculation.
2. MultiParty Computation: Will be described in section
3.1.2
3. Threshold Schemes: Will be described lately in section
3.3
4. Zero-knowledge Proofs: Used to prove the knowledge of
some information, without revealing it.
5. Watermarking and Fingerprint schemes: Homomorphic
property is used to apply a mark to a data earlier encrypted,
in watermarking case. For fingerprint schemes, the user
who buys a good has to be identifiable to be sure he doesn’t
redistribute data in illegal way. In an IoT environment
it can be used like some sort of authentication to protect
user’s privacy.
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6. Mix-Nets: Mix-Nets are protocols which provides server
anonimation gathering encrypted messages from different
users. A desirable property for this kind of protocols is re-
encryption, achievable using homomorphic cryptography
7. Data aggregation in WSN: It’s a technique which combine
partial data obtained from single nodes, inside intermedi-
ate nodes, to reduce the communication overhead opti-
mizing bandwidth usage of wireless links. In military and
medical applications privacy of these data is critical, so
the gathering has to be done keeping data protected also
to intermediate nodes. For this reason homomorphic cryp-
tography is used, to protect data and aggregate them when
they are already encrypted through specific functions for
WSNs.
3.1.2 Fully homomorphic cryptosystem
A cryptosystem that supports arbitrary computation on cipher-
texts is known as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and is
far more powerful. Such a scheme enables the construction of
programs for any desirable functionality, which can be run on
encrypted inputs to produce an encryption of the result. Since
such a program never decrypts its inputs, it can be run by an un-
trusted party without revealing its inputs and internal state. The
existence of an efficient and fully homomorphic cryptosystem
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would have great practical implications in the outsourcing of
private computations, for instance, in the context of cloud com-
puting. The utility of fully homomorphic encryption has been
long recognized. The problem of constructing such a scheme
was first proposed within a year of the development of RSA [24].
A solution proved more elusive; for more than 30 years, it was
unclear whether fully homomorphic encryption was even possi-
ble. During that period, partial results included the Boneh–Goh–Nissim
cryptosystem that supports evaluation of an unlimited number of
addition operations but at most one multiplication, [2] and the
Ishai-Paskin cryptosystem that supports evaluation of (polynomial-
size) Branching program [11].
Gentry FHE scheme
Craig Gentry [7], using lattice-based cryptography, described
the first plausible construction for a fully homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme. Gentry’s scheme supports both addition and mul-
tiplication operations on ciphertexts, from which it is possible
to construct circuits for performing arbitrary computation.The
construction starts from a somewhat homomorphic encryption
scheme, which is limited to evaluating low-degree polynomi-
als over encrypted data. (It is limited because each ciphertext
is noisy in some sense, and this noise grows as one adds and
multiplies ciphertexts, until ultimately the noise makes the re-
sulting ciphertext indecipherable.) Gentry then shows how to
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slightly modify this scheme to make it bootstrappable, i.e., ca-
pable of evaluating its own decryption circuit and then at least
one more operation. Finally, he shows that any bootstrappable
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme can be converted
into a fully homomorphic encryption through a recursive self-
embedding. For Gentry’s "noisy" scheme, the bootstrapping
procedure effectively "refreshes" the ciphertext by applying to
it the decryption procedure homomorphically, thereby obtaining
a new ciphertext that encrypts the same value as before but has
lower noise. By "refreshing" the ciphertext periodically when-
ever the noise grows too large, it is possible to compute arbitrary
number of additions and multiplications without increasing the
noise too much. Gentry based the security of his scheme on the
assumed hardness of two problems: certain worst-case prob-
lems over ideal lattices, and the sparse (or low-weight) subset
sum problem. Gentry’s Ph.D. thesis [8] provides additional de-
tails. Regarding performance, ciphertexts in Gentry’s scheme
remain compact insofar as their lengths do not depend at all
on the complexity of the function that is evaluated over the en-
crypted data, but the scheme is impractical, and its ciphertext
size and computation time increase sharply as one increases the
security level. The main problem of Gentry’s scheme was that
it’s completely impractical, because it exponentially growths the
calculation time to grant a security level comparable to the other
similar algorithms.
Bruce Schneier said that: "Gentry’s scheme is completely im-
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practical... Gentry estimates that performing a Google search
with encrypted keywords - a perfectly reasonable simple appli-
cation of this algorithm - would increase the amount of comput-
ing time by about a trillion.” After the publication of Gentry’s
phd thesis IBM has created a tool called HELib to implement
FHE.
In 2011 Gentry, Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [3]proposed a
new FHE scheme which drastically improve Gentry scheme and
sets up security on weaker hypothesis, all without bootstrapping
procedure. This proposal sets up on Learning-Without-Error or
Ring-LWE problems, which have a security level of 2n against
known attacks. The latter offer equal results of the first with
worst performances. Results are:
• Gentry per-gate computation: O(n3.5)
• RLWE L-level arithmetic circuits per-gate computation:
O(nL3)
• RLWE L-level arithmetic circuits per-gate computation
with optimization: O(n2)
On-The-Fly MultiParty Computation (MPC)
Another FHE application scheme came out in 2012 from Lopez-
Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan [16], who proposed a new vi-
sion of secure multiparty computation using FHE. In this pro-
posal was indeed possible for the cloud to non-interactively per-
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form arbitrary, dynamically chosen computations on data be-
longing to arbitrary sets of users chosen on-the-fly. All user’s
input data and intermediate results are protected from snooping
by the cloud as well as other users. This extends the standard no-
tion of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), where users can
only enlist the cloud’s help in evaluating functions on their own
encrypted data. In on-the-fly MPC, each user is involved only
when initially uploading his (encrypted) data to the cloud, and in
a final output decryption phase when outputs are revealed; the
complexity of both is independent of the function being com-
puted and the total number of users in the system. When users
upload their data, they don’t need to decide in advance which
function will be computed, nor whom they will compute with;
they need only retroactively to approve the eventually chosen
functions and on whose data the functions were evaluated.
3.2 Anonymous Authentication
Anonymous Authentication allows a server to confirm a partic-
ular user’s privileges to use a chosen service authenticating in
the system without exposing hiw own identity. It allows to be
protected against attackers who want to track and identify online
users.
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3.2.1 Anonymous Authentication in IoT
In 2012 Alcaide et al. [1] proposed a form of Anonymous Au-
thentication usable in an IoT environment. The roles used in
the algorithm are two: Users and Data Collectors. First ones
generate data and can authenticate themselves anonymously and
unlinkably on Data Collectors (DC) possessing an Anonymous
Authentication Certificate (AAC). DCs are the entities respon-
sible for gathering data transmitted from authorized users. It
implies that DCs have to verify that users transmitting data have
correct AACs. Main characteristics of this protocols are:
• It doesn’t set up on a central unit, neither for setup phase,
implying that all the parameters necessary for the protocol
to work are generated in a cooperative way by all system
nodes.
• Users generate and distribute a private key through (t,n)
Threshold Cryptography 3.3 allowing the system to have
until t users compromised without the system being com-
promised itself.
• This protocol is based on the scheme proposed by Per-
siano and Visconti in 2004.
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3.3 Threshold Cryptography
A threshold cryptosystem [5] consists of the four following
components:
• A key generation algorithm takes as input a security pa-
rameter k, the number l of decryption servers, the thresh-
old parameter t, and a random string w; it outputs a pub-
lic key PK, a list SK1, . . . ,SKl of private keys and a list
V K,V K1, . . . ,V Kl of verification keys.
• An encryption algorithm takes as input the public key PK,
a random string w and a plaintext M; it outputs a cipher-
text c.
• A share decryption algorithm takes as input the public key
PK, an index 1≤ i≤ l, the private key SKi and a ciphertext
c; it outputs a decryption share ci and a proof of its validity
proo fi.
• A combining algorithm takes as input the public key PK,
a cyphertext c, a list c1, . . . ,cl of decryption shares, the list
V K,V K1, . . . ,V Kl of verification keys and a list
proo f1,...,proo fl of validity proofs; it outputs a plaintext
M or fails.
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3.3.1 Application Scenario
To analyze security properties we simulate a “game” including
the following players: a dealer, a combiner, a set of l servers
Pi, an adversary and users. All are considered as probabilistic
polynomial time Turing machines. We consider the following
scenario:
1. In an initialization phase, the dealer uses the key gener-
ation algorithm to create the public, private and verifica-
tion keys. The public key PK and all the verification keys
V K,V Ki are publicized and each server receives its share
SKi of the secret key SK.
2. To encrypt a message, any user can run the encryption
algorithm using the public key PK.
3. To decrypt a ciphertext c, the combiner first forwards c to
the servers. Using their secret keys SKi and their verifi-
cation keys V K,V Ki each server runs the decryption algo-
rithm and outputs a partial decryption ci with a proof of
validity of the partial decryption proo fi. Finally the com-
biner uses the combining algorithm to recover the cleart-
ext if enough partial decryptions are valid.
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3.3.2 Security requirements
We consider an adversary able to corrupt up to t servers. Such
a corruption can be passive, i.e. the attacker only eavesdrop the
servers. It can also consist in making the servers fail and stop.
Finally, it can be active; in this last case, the adversary com-
pletely controls the behavior of the corrupted servers. In the fol-
lowing, we only consider non-adaptive adversaries who choose
which servers they want to corrupt before key generation.
A threshold cryptosystem is said to be t-robust if the combiner
is able to correctly decrypt any ciphertext, even in the presence
of an adversary who actively corrupts up to t-servers.
All messages are sent in clear between each server and the com-
biner. Moreover, the combining algorithm which takes each par-
tial decryption and recovers the cleartext is public and can be
executed by any server as they see all decryption parts. So the
only assumption we make about the communication channel is
the existence of a broadcast channel between all participants.
Threshold semantic security
All the encryption schemes we study are semantically secure.
Informally speaking, let us consider an attacker who first issues
two messages M0 and M1; we randomly choose one of these
messages, we encrypt it and we send this ciphertext to the at-
tacker. Finally, she answer which message has been encrypted.
We say that the encryption scheme is semantically secure if there
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exists no such polynomial time attacker able to guess which of
the two messages has been encrypted with a non-negligible ad-
vantage.
We extend the definition of semantic security to threshold cryp-
tosystems in the setting where an attacker who actively, but non-
adaptively, corrupts t servers learns not only the public param-
eters, as in the regular cryptosystem, but also the secret keys
of the corrupted servers, the public verification keys, all the de-
cryption shares and the proof of validity of those shares.
Let us consider the following game A:
• A1: The attacker chooses to corrupt t servers. She learns
all their secret information and she actively controls their
behavior.
• A2: The key generation algorithm is run; the public keys
are publicized, each server receives its secret key and the
attacker learns the secrets of the corrupted players.
• A3: The attacker chooses a message M and a partial de-
cryption oracle gives her l valid decryption shares of the
encryption of M, along with proofs of validity. This step
is repeated as many times as the attacker wishes.
• A4: The attacker issues two messages M0 and M1 and
sends them to an encryption oracle who randomly chooses
a bit b and sends back an encryption c of Mb to the at-
tacker.
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• A5: The attacker repeats step A3, asking for decryption
shares of encryptions of chosen messages.
• A6: The attacker outputs a bit b′
A threshold encryption scheme is said to be semantically
secure against active non-adaptive adversaries if for any poly-
nomial time attacker, b = b′ with probability only negligible
greater than 1/2.
Notice that our definition of semantic security reduces to the
original one when we consider only one server (l = 1) who
knows the secret key, and an adversary who does not corrupt
any server (t = 0). In this case, steps A3 and A5 just consists
into encrypting chosen plaintexts and this can be done without
the help of partial decryption oracle.
Finally the previous game may not be confused with the cho-
sen ciphertext attack security described by Gennaro and Shoup
[6]. The attacker can only ask for partial decryptions of cipher-
text for which she already knows the corresponding plaintext.
The goal of steps A3 and A5 is to prove that partial decryptions
give no information about the private keys of the non-corrupted
servers. Since the cryptosystems we study are not immunized
against chosen ciphertext attacks in the non-distributed case, we
cannot expect to extend such a property to threshold versions.
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Security Proofs
The aim is to provide robust threshold version of semantically
secure cryptosystems. Our security proofs are based on reduc-
tion; we prove that if an adversary can break the semantic se-
curity of the threshold cryptosystem, then she must be able to
break the semantic security of the initial cryptosystem.
We show how to build an adversary to attack the semantic secu-
rity of the traditional cryptosystem from an adversary who can
break the security of the threshold cryptosystem. The basic idea
in order to use an attacker against the threshold version and to
turn her into an attacker against the traditional cryptosystem, is
to simulate all the extra information that are not provided in a
traditional attack.
More precisely, if we are able to simulate the public verification
keys and the secret keys of corrupted servers in step A2, the de-
cryption shares and their proof of validity in steps A3 and A5
in such a way that the adversary cannot distinguish between the
real distribution and the simulated one, we can feed this adver-
sary with simulated data in order to obtain an attacker against the
semantic security of the initial non-distributed scheme. Conse-
quently, the security proofs consist into showing how to simulate
all those data.
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3.3.3 Shamir threshold secret sharing scheme
In 1979, Shamir proposed a protocol to share a secret element
s of a field F between l servers in such a way that any group
of t + 1 servers can efficiently recover s but any coalition of t
servers is not able to gain any information about the secret.
The scheme is based on the Lagrange interpolation formula that
allows to compute P(X), for any X ∈ F , if P is a polynomial of
degree t and if t +1 values of P(xi) are known for t +1 distinct
elements x1, . . . ,xt+1 of F :
P(X) = ∑t+1i=1∏
t+1
j=1; j ̸=1
X−x j
xi−x j ×P(xi)
In order to share a secret a, a polynomial P of degree t is
randomly chosen in F [X ] such that P(0) = s and each server
receives a point (xi,P(xi)) with xi ̸= 0. The Lagrange formula
shows that the knowledge of t +1 such points allows to recover
the whole polynomial P and consequently P(0) = s. One can
also prove that knowledge of t points gives no information about
s.
3.3.4 Paillier cryptosystem
Various cryptosystems based on randomized encryption schemes
E(M) which encrypt a message M by raising a basis g to the
power M have been proposed so far. Their security is based on
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the intractability of computing discrete logarithm in the basis g
without a secret data, the secret key, and easy using this trap-
door. We call those cryptosystems trapdoor discrete logarithm
schemes. As an important consequence of this encryption tech-
nique, those schemes have homomorphic properties that can be
informally stated as follows:
E(M1+M2) = E(M1)×E(M2) and E(k×M) = E(M)k
Paillier has presented three closely related such cryptosys-
tems in [19]. We only remind the first one. This cryptosystem
is based on the properties of the Carmichael lambda function
(λ (•))in Z∗n2 . We recall here the main two properties:
For any w ∈ Z∗n2 ,
wλ (n) = 1mod n, and wnλ (n) = 1mod n2
Key Generation
Let n be an RSA modulus n = pq, where p and q are prime
integers. Let g be an integer of order n modulo n2. The public
key is PK = (n,g) and the secret key is SK = λ (n).
Encryption
To encrypt a message M ∈ Zn, randomly choose x in Z∗ and
compute the ciphertext c = gMxnmod n2.
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Decryption
To decrypt c, compute M= L(c
λ (n)mod n2)
L(gλ (n)mod n2
mod n)where the L func-
tion takes in input elements from the set Sn = {u< n2|u= 1mod n}
and L(u) = u−1n .
The integers L(cλ (n)mod n2) and L(gλ (n)mod n2) are equal
to 1 when they are raised to the power n so they are the nth roots
of unity. Furthermore, such roots are of the form (1+ n)β =
1+βnmod n2. Consequently, the L-function allows to compute
such values β mod n and
L((gM)λ (n)mod n2) = M×L(gλ (n)mod n2)mod n.
Security
It is conjectured that the so-called composite residuosity class
problem, that exactly consists in inverting the cryptosystem, is
intractable. The semantic security is based on the difficulty to
distinguish nth residues modulo n2. We refer to [19] for details.
3.3.5 Paillier threshold cryptosystem
3.3.6 Key generation algorithm
Choose an integer n, product of two strong primes p and q, such
that p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 and gcd(n,ϕ(n)) = 1. Set
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m = p′q′. Let β be an element randomly chosen in Zn*. Then
randomly choose (a,b)∈Z∗n×Z∗n and set g= (1+n)a×bn mod
n2. The secret key SK=β ×m is shared with the Shamir scheme:
let a0 = βm, randomly choose t values ai in {0, . . . ,n×m− 1}
and set f (X) = ∑ti=0 aiX i. The share si of the ith server Pi is
f (i) mod nm. The public key PK consists of g,n and the value
θ = L(gmb) = amβ mod n. Let VK= V be a square that gen-
erates the cyclic group of squares in Z∗n2 . The verification keys
VKi are obtained with the formula v∆si mod n, recalling that
∆ = l! with l number of nodes in the group.
Encryption algorithm
To encrypt a message M, randomly pick x ∈ Z∗n and compute
c = gMxn mod n2.
Share decryption algorithm
The ith player Pi computes the decryption share ci = c2∆si mod
n2 using his secret share si. He makes a proof of correct decryp-
tion which assures c4∆ mod n2 and v∆ mod n2 have been raised
to the same power si in order to obtain c2i and vi.
Combining algorithm
If less than t decryption shares have valid proofs of correctness,
the algorithm fails. Otherwise, let S be a set of t+1 valid shares
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and compute the plaintext
M = L(∏ j∈S c
2µS0, j
j mod n
2)× 14∆2θ mod n
where µS0, j = ∆ ×∏ j′∈S\{ j} j
′
j′− j ∈ Z
Security evaluation
We proved that Paillier threshold cryptosystem is secure against
an active, non adaptive adversary and this gives the indistin-
guishability (IND) characteristic to the algorithm. As mentioned
before, the homomorphic property of the Paillier threshold cryp-
tosystem makes this system malleable, but, introducing the ran-
dom number r in the encryption procedure, avoid the possibility
to create a meaningful malevolent message m′. By the above
characteristics, this scheme is defined as IND-CCA2 (indistin-
guishability under adaptive chosen cyphertext attack) which is
the necessary property for a Public Key cryptosystem.
Chapter 4
Group Authentication in IoT
4.1 Application scenario
The purpose of this scheme is to give MANETs nodes 4.1the
chance to authenticate themselves in a lightweight and scalable
way. It verifies the authenticity of each node which wants to
participate in group activity. Possible scenarios in which this
scheme can be used are mainly military scenarios (where high
level of security is required) and disaster areas (where high secu-
rity is suggested). The proposed scheme allows multi-to-multi
authentication in group applications. An example of possible
use of this scheme is to create a sort of an encrypted VPN where
all members can safely talk, being sure no inside or outside at-
tackers can disrupt their communication. A possible applica-
tion is to create hierarchy groups to let Generals talk to Gener-
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als, Lieutenant-Generals with Lieutenant-Generals and Gener-
als, and so on. In summary to allow a hierarchical and secure
way of communication.
Fig. 4.1 Manet structure: blue and green nodes belong to both
group A and B, while blue nodes belong only to group B
The proposed scheme was born to face the typical problem
of constrained resources in an IoT environment. In particular,
we use it in a Mobile Ad-hoc NETwork scenario which accom-
plish the above mentioned characteristic. To decentralize the
computational effort of the proposed scheme, let all members of
the group to authenticate each other, in a Multi-to-Multi way,
avoiding a single point of failure in the system, improving the
overall security of this scheme.
To achieve this goal we used Paillier Threshold Cryptography,
which is a public key variant of the (t,n) threshold scheme where
t is threshold and n is number of group members. This cryptog-
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raphy scheme helps to achieve homomorphic properties which
is helpful in preserving privacy of members but also dangerous,
because it makes this scheme Malleable (we will explain after
the security issues). By the fact it’s a probabilistic asymmetric
public key encryption system, which uses randomness in the en-
cryption algorithm, encrypting the same plaintext several times
produces a different cyphertext each time. The proposed scheme
is used to verify the authenticity of all the members taking part
in a group oriented application, it also establish a shared secret
key between the members of the group which can be used for
further communication in any group oriented application.
4.2 Mobile Ad-hoc NETwork
Future information technology [27] will be mainly based on
wireless technology. Traditional cellular and mobile networks
are still, in some sense, limited by their need for infrastructure
(i.e., base stations, routers). For mobile ad hoc networks, this
final limitation is eliminated. Ad hoc networks are key to the
evolution of wireless networks. They are typically composed
of equal nodes that communicate over wireless links without
any central control. Although military tactical communication
is still considered the primary application for ad hoc networks,
commercial interest in this type of networks continues to grow.
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Applications such as rescue missions in times of natural disas-
ters, law enforcement operations, commercial and educational
use, and sensor networks are just a few possible commercial ex-
amples. Ad hoc wireless networks inherit the traditional prob-
lems of wireless and mobile communications, such as band-
width optimization, power control, and transmission quality en-
hancement. In addition, the multihop nature and the lack of
fixed infrastructure generates new research problems such as
configuration advertising, discovery, and maintenance, as well
as ad hoc addressing and self-routing. In mobile ad hoc net-
works, topology is highly dynamic and random. In addition,
the distribution of nodes and, eventually, their capability of self-
organizing play an important role. The main characteristics can
be summarized as follows:
• The topology is highly dynamic and frequent changes in
the topology may be hard to predict.
• Mobile ad hoc networks are based on wireless links, which
will continue to have a significantly lower capacity than
their wired counterparts.
• Physical security is limited due to the wireless transmis-
sion.
• Mobile ad hoc networks are affected by higher loss rates,
and can experience higher delays and jitter than fixed net-
works due to the wireless transmission.
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• Mobile ad hoc network nodes rely on batteries or other
exhaustible power supplies for their energy. As a con-
sequence, energy savings are an important system design
criterion. Furthermore, nodes have to be power-aware: the
set of functions offered by a node depends on its available
power (CPU, memory, etc.).
A well-designed architecture for mobile ad hoc networks in-
volves all networking layers, ranging from the physical to the
application layer.
Despite the fact that the management of the physical layer is
of fundamental importance, there has been very little research
in this area: nodes in mobile ad hoc networks are confronted
with a number of problems, which, in existing mobile networks,
are solved by the base stations. The solution space ranges from
hierarchical cell structures (a self-organized pendant of cellular
networks) to completely ad hoc, stochastic allocations. Power
management is of paramount importance. General strategies for
saving power need to be addressed, as well as adaptation to the
specifics of nodes of general channel and source coding meth-
ods, radio resource management, and multiple access. Mobile
ad hoc networks do not rely on one single technology; instead,
they should be able to capitalize on technology advances. One
challenge is to define a set of abstractions that can be used by the
upper layers and still not preclude the use of new physical layer
methods as they emerge. Primitives of such an abstraction are,
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for example, the capabilities and covering ranges of multicast
and unicast channels. Information such as node distribution,
network density, link failures, etc., must be shared among layers,
and the MAC layer and the network layer need to collaborate in
order to have a better view of the network topology and to op-
timize the number of messages in the network. Mobile ad hoc
networks have the unique characteristic of being totally indepen-
dent from any authority or infrastructure, providing great poten-
tial for the users. In fact, roughly speaking, two or more users
can become a mobile ad hoc network simply by being close
enough to meet the radio constraints, without any external inter-
vention. Moreover, telecommunication networks are expected
to grow with the advent of new (and totally unexpected) appli-
cations. Although in the past telecommunication networks were
studied and developed as separate building blocks, for users of
mobile ad hoc networks the interaction between higher layers
and lower layers is essential. Resilient and adaptive applica-
tions that can continue to perform effectively under degraded
conditions can significantly enhance network operations from a
user’s perspective. Such applications can also significantly ease
the design pressure in complex engineering areas such as quality
of service (QoS) and mobile routing at the network layer [17].
Communication among layers is the only practical approach to
a demanding environment that raises issues that rarely occur in
other networks [26].
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4.3 Proposed scheme
The proposed scheme is composed by three parts, a Phase 0, in
which every node creates a couple (PRi,PUi) used for securing
the communications, a Pre-phase, in which the group is formed,
and an Authentication phase, where the users belonging to the
group are authenticated and a secret session key is shared in
order to secure further group communications. Every step is
carried out by particular and predefined messages: Join, Req,
Resp and Leave, which will be described later in this chapter.
4.3.1 Phase 0
In this phase every node belonging to the MANET creates a cou-
ple (PRi,PUi) in order to secure further communications, and
broadcast the Public key to all the MANET nodes.
4.3.2 Pre-phase
In this phase, every node who knows the group credentials asks a
Group Authority (which can be any ordinary node of the MANET,
usually the one which starts the group activity, GA from now on)
to join the group sending a Join message (Figure 4.2(a)) to it in
a secure way. This is made by means of the couple (PRi,PUi)
generated and broadcasted in phase 0 by simply encrypting the
Join message with the GA Public Key. When GA has checked
the correctness of the credentials, it updates the parameters n
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and t, it creates a new couple of keys, PRG and PUG, and then
it divide the PRG into n shares by Shamir secret sharing (as ex-
plained in the subsection 3.3.6). At this point the GA sends
all the shares to the nodes, encrypting them with the recipient
Public Key, (Figure 4.2(b)) securing that no inside or outside
attackers can eavesdrop the share.
4.3.3 Authentication phase
In order to start group activity, it has to be performed the group
authentication, as a pre-requisite to check if all the members
M1, . . . ,Mm (where t ≤ m ≤ n) are part of the group. The GA
chooses a pseudo-random number as a session secret [SS] key
which is going to be shared with all the members of the group
once the group authentication is done. This is encrypted us-
ing the public key PUG of the group, and sent to all the active
members of the group (Figure 4.2(c)). It is possible to recognize
active from passive members by a procedure performed by GA
periodically.
When a communication session needs to be started, and pe-
riodically after that, GA sends a Req message to all the group
members (Figure 4.3(a)). They can actually answer with a Resp
message or no respond at all (Figure 4.3(b)). Every time a Group
Activity Check procedure is performed, GA updates its list of
active members and the number m. It has to be performed every
x minutes, where x < SSre f reshtime and if m doesn’t change SS is
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(a) Join request (b) Share distribution
(c) Message broadcasting (d) PDMs creation
(e) PDMs broadcasting
Fig. 4.2 Authentication phase
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not changed.
If a member doesn’t respond after a predefined timeout, it’s
assumed as not active. After that, GA starts the Authentication
phase and each of the members, upon receiving the message
M = {[SS]PUG ,H[SS],N1}
applies his private key part to decrypt it (Figure 4.2(d)), ob-
taining in this way his own Partial Decryption Message (PDM
from now on). Each user has his own unique PDM, correspond-
ing to a different share of the group’s Private Key PRG.
PDMi = Decrypt(M)K pri
Each device then sends his PDM to every active member of
the group, including GA (Figure 4.2(e)). All the devices wait to
combine all the PDMs until m− 1 are received. The advantage
of the threshold comes up in this step, indeed with only one ini-
tial distribution of the shares Kpri (Figure 4.2(b)) the group can
start communications with a number t ≤m≤ n of members, and
m is always known thanks to the Group Activity Check proce-
dure.
Each device so combine all the m received PDMs in order to
obtain the decrypted session key.
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SS =Combine(PDM1,PDM2, . . . ,PDMm)
If combining all PDM shares is successful, the session key
is obtained and it proves that all the members are part of that
group. The decrypted session key is hashed to get H ′[SS] and
checked with the one sent by the GA. If H ′[SS] = H[SS], then
authentication is successful, and session key [SS] is obtained. It
can be used for further communications between the devices,
and it can be carried out by using Symmetric Key Encryption. If
combining all PDM shares is unsuccessful, it means that there
is at least one non-member in the group, and, hence, the activ-
ity cannot be initiated, and group authentication fails. Further
individual authentication needs to be performed to identify the
non-member in the group.
4.4 Messages exchange
Possible messages, as said before, are four: Join, Req, Resp,
Leave.
4.4.1 Join
Join message is used by a node to join the Group (Figure 4.2(a));
it contains the Group credentials, the node ID, an encrypted
hash, a timestamp (to avoid replay attacks, a nonce is not enough
because GA doesn’t respond to this message, so the node can’t
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(a) Req broadcasting
(b) User responses
Fig. 4.3 Group Activity Check
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check the nonce, and the timestamp is not replayable by an at-
tacker because message is authenticated by an encrypted hash)
and all is encrypted with the GA public key.
Join = {TY PE =
1|(Gid,Gpw)|node ID|H[ join−H]PRi|T S}PUGA
When a node sends the Join message, it starts a timeout,
based on physical distance between MANET nodes; if it doesn’t
receive his share until timeout is expired, it sends the Join mes-
sage again, changing Timestamp and the Hash.
When GA receive the Join message, it updates the values
(t,n) and start the Pre-phase.
4.4.2 Req
Req message is used either to start a group activity or to update
the GA’s list of active nodes (Figure 4.3(a)). The node which
starts the group activity is elected as GA for the current session.
Req message is sent to all n nodes which have a share.
Req = {TY PE = 2|GA ID|H[Req−H]PRGA|Nonce}PUdst
When GA sends the Req message, it starts a timeout, based
on physical distance between MANET nodes, if it doesn’t re-
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ceive responses from each of n nodes until the timeout is ex-
pired, it updates the list of active nodes and handles the non-
responding nodes as not active. If a node is not active for x
times consecutively, GA update (t,n) and begin the Pre-phase.
When a node receive the Req message, it can respond with
either a Resp message or no respond at all.
4.4.3 Resp
Resp message is sent by nodes to GA as a response to a Req
message, to communicate their presence in the upcoming com-
munication session.
Resp = {TY PE = 3|node ID|Nonce+1}PUGA
When a node sends the Resp message, it just waits to receive
the M message (Figure 4.2(c)).
When GA receives the Resp message, it updates the active
member list, and waits either to receive all n messages or the ex-
piring of Timeout (Figure 4.3(b)). Then it sends the M message
to the m active nodes.
4.4.4 Leave
Leave message is sent by nodes to GA in order to leave the
group.
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Leave = {TY PE = 4|node ID|H[Leave−H]PRi}PUGA
When a node sends the Leave message it will not be able to
communicate with the group until he’ll do another Join.
When GA receives a Leave message, it updates the values
(t,n) and begins a new Pre-phase with updated values.
4.5 Implementation
The implementation of this work has been done on a Manet
composed by 5 nodes. Each of them is an HP Compaq tc4200
with following specifications:
• O.S.: Linux Ubuntu 10.04 with 2.6.38 kernel
• CPU: Intel Celeron M370 (1.50 Ghz, 1MB L2 Cache,
400MHz FSB)
• RAM: 2GB DDR2
• Wireless card: Intel PRO/Wireless 2200BG (802.11b/g)
By the fact that the wireless card has very poor features, we
used a wireless usb card, a TP-Link TL-WN722N, with follow-
ing specifications:
• 802.11b/g
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• 150Mbps
• Ad-Hoc and Infrastructured modalities.
The characteristics of those PCs are chosen to simulate in
the best way constrained resources to fit better IoT environment
characteristics. Every node has his own static IP from the range
10.0.0.3 to 10.0.0.7. The programming language used is Java™
SE Runtime Environment (build 1.8.0_40− b25) and the only
pre-compiled library used is the Paillier Threshold Encryption
Toolbox created by Dallas Texas University, which uses partic-
ular maths to lighten cpu’s calculation effort. The code is com-
posed by a Deamon running on every node which first reads a
configuration file in which are present the initial conditions, and
then runs silently until it’s waken up by the beginning of some
phase. To let the nodes receive, send and process data at the
same time, it has to be built up a Multithreaded Server-Client
running on every node.
4.5.1 Multithreaded Server
Thread t = new Thread ( new S e r v e r H a n d l e r (
myPR , pv , sv , pdmc ) , " R e c e i v i n g S e r v e r " ) ;
t . s t a r t ( ) ;
where ServerHandler() is the class which implements the
runnable used to receive and synchronize the classes and the
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objects involved in the code. The other parameters are myPR
which is a PaillierPrivateKey Object containing the Private Key
of the node; pv, sv and pdmc are classes used to synchronize
the various objects through different threads. Since we used a
multithreaded server-client architecture, it’s needed a way to let
the different threads alert each other when a shared object is
ready to be used by other threads. For this reason every shared
class is synchronized and has 2 particular methods: get() and
put(). The first one is used by a thread to request an object
contained in one of the following classes: pv, sv and pdmc, con-
taining a share, an encrypted SS and a PDM respectively. In
more detail, the way used to let a thread communicate another
that an object is ready is the following: get() contains a wait()
method, which puts the thread who called it in a sleeping phase.
The thread which is processing the object, when is ready, calls
a put(), which contains a noti f y() method, used to wake up the
sleeping thread. In this way there are no chances from the thread
calling get() to work on an object not ready to be processed. So,
the shared classes pv, sv and pdmc passed to the class Server-
Handler to let all the threads work on the same, synchronized,
objects. Here is an example of the get() and put() methods:
p u b l i c s y n c h r o n i z e d vo id p u t ( B i g I n t e g e r SS ) {
t h i s . SS=SS ;
t o k e n = t r u e ; / / PPTK i s u s a b l e
n o t i f y ( ) ;
}
p u b l i c s y n c h r o n i z e d B i g I n t e g e r g e t ( ) {
i f ( ! t o k e n )
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t r y {
w a i t ( ) ;
} c a t c h ( I n t e r r u p t e d E x c e p t i o n exc ) {
exc . p r i n t S t a c k T r a c e ( ) ;
}
r e t u r n SS ;
}
The ServerHandler in turn, contains in his run() method,
the method used to receive objects, which is newClientHandler(
clientSocket, PrivKey, pv,sv,pdmc) As stated before, to use the
same objects in different threads, we passed PrivKey (the pri-
vate key of the node), the other structures listed before and the
Object clientSocket, used to open a receiving socket whenever
a node wants to transmit some objects to my node. Here are
parts of the code used in the receiving part, contained in the
newClientHandler class.
O b j e c t O u t p u t S t r e a m oos = new O b j e c t O u t p u t S t r e a m (
c l i e n t S o c k e t . g e t O u t p u t S t r e a m ( ) ) ;
O b j e c t I n p u t S t r e a m o i s = new O b j e c t I n p u t S t r e a m (
c l i e n t S o c k e t . g e t I n p u t S t r e a m ( ) ) ;
B i g I n t e g e r [ ] msg =( B i g I n t e g e r [ ] ) o i s . r e a d O b j e c t ( ) ;
Here is declared and associated an Object Stream to the clien-
tSocket opened in the ServerHandler class, and then is casted
and put in an array of BigInteger the message received. It’s put
in this form because the encryption and decryption is operated
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on BigIntegers, and into array to allow flexible key dimension.
At this point some processing is elaborated on the first element
of the array, which contains encrypted data useful to understand
what message we just received, and then a switch case is in-
serted:
• Case 1: Received a Share
• Case 2: Received the encrypted SS
• Case 3: Received the PDM from GA
• Case 4 to n+3: Received the correspondent node PDM
Cases 4 to n+3 are very important (and serializable in the
code) for the pdmc structure, which puts one of the received
PDMs in its position, and only when at least m PDMs are ar-
rived, its method put() gives the noti f y() to the main thread to
let him proceed with the combining algorithm. To transmit, it’s
used a method ObjectTransmit( port, ipv4, msg) which takes as
input the port and the ipv4 address used to communicate with
the recipient, and the array of BigIntegers msg. Here’s the code:
c l i e n t S o c k = new So ck e t ( ipv4 , p o r t ) ;
System . o u t . p r i n t l n ( " C o n n e c t i n g . . . " ) ;
O b j e c t O u t p u t S t r e a m oos = new
O b j e c t O u t p u t S t r e a m ( c l i e n t S o c k . g e t O u t p u t S t r e a m ( ) ) ;
O b j e c t I n p u t S t r e a m o i s = new
O b j e c t I n p u t S t r e a m ( c l i e n t S o c k . g e t I n p u t S t r e a m ( ) ) ;
msg = ( S t r i n g ) o i s . r e a d O b j e c t ( ) ;
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i f ( msg . e q u a l s ( rx c o n d i t i o n ) ) {
System . o u t . p r i n t l n ( "OK, p r o c e d i n g t o send Msg " ) ;
oos . w r i t e O b j e c t ( Bmsg ) ;
4.5.2 Encryption and Decryption
The encryption and decryption side of the code is mainly cre-
ated by the Paillier Threshold Encryption Toolbox, using Pail-
lierPrivateKey, PaillierKey and Paillier classes (and some oth-
ers..). Each one of them is a class containing different fields to
fit the structure of Paillier Cryptosystem. To encrypt an object (a
number or a string) it has to be put in a BigInteger, we use them
because longs are not capacious enough to contain all the bits
we use for a key. Here’s an example of how to encrypt a number
or a string. To encrypt a String object it has to be converted in a
BigInteger.
b y t e [ ] bytemsg= mySt r ing . g e t B y t e s ( ) ;
B i g I n t e g e r M=new B i g I n t e g e r ( bytemsg ) ;
P a i l l i e r e s y s =new P a i l l i e r ( ) ;
e s y s . s e t E n c r y p t i o n (myPR ) ;
B i g I n t e g e r Cyph= e s y s . e n c r y p t (M) ;
Depending on how long has to be the Public or Private key
(it’s possible to choose inside the script the number of digits the
key has to be long, from 32 to 256) we have to work on chunks
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of dimension lesser than key’s one. So I worked with Electronic
CodeBook mode (ECB) trunking BigIntegers into parts of the
right dimension to encrypt or decrypt.
4.5.3 Daemons
Every Daemon but the GA’s one, is the same, just loading the
configuration file it sets up the number of initial nodes, their
IPs and the group credentials (which in a real application are
pre-distributed to every node). Differently the GA node has his
own Daemon in my implementation, however the possibility to
have only one daemon for every node is practicable, just setting
the GA’s block of code in a i f case, with the information of
which node has to be the GA contained in the cfg file. The
initial informations contained in the cfg file are:
1. The max number of nodes n contained in the group.
2. The dimension k of the Group’s Public (and consequently
Private) key.
3. The threshold law to calculate t.
4. The group credentials.
Every Daemon so reads the cfg file and sets itself up. Now
we see an example of the logical operations the GA has to do,
and then we’ll see the single node’s ones.
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1) l o a d s t h e c f g f i l e
PHASE 0
1) G e n e r a t e i t ’ s c o u p l e PR , PK
i n t nodeID=nID ;
Random random = new Random ( ) ;
l ong seed = random . nextLong ( ) ;
P a i l l i e r P r i v a t e K e y pr = KeyGen . P a i l l i e r K e y ( s , s eed ) ;
P a i l l i e r K e y pu= pr . g e t P u b l i c K e y ( ) ;
2 ) Pu t P u b l i c Key i n t o a f i l e
t o be b r o a d c a s t e d
S t r i n g pubkey =" s r c / f i l e s / Pub l i cKey "+ nodeID ;
t r y { F i l e W r i t e r F i l e = new F i l e W r i t e r ( pubkey ) ;
P r i n t W r i t e r o u t =new P r i n t W r i t e r ( F i l e ) ;
o u t . p r i n t l n ( " n : " + pu . getN ( ) ) ;
o u t . c l o s e ( ) ; }
c a t c h ( IOExcep t ion e ) {
System . o u t . p r i n t l n ( e ) ;
}
PRE−PHASE
2) g e n e r a t e s t h e s h a r e s
i n t l =n ;
i n t w= ( l / 2 ) + 1 ;
Random rnd =new Random ( ) ;
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l ong l s = rnd . nextLong ( ) ;
S t r i n g S t r k e y s =" c h i a v i " ;
KeyGen . P a i l l i e r T h r e s h o l d K e y ( S t r k e y s , s , l , w, l s ) ;
S t r i n g [ ] c h i a v i = new S t r i n g [ l ] ;
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < l ; i ++){
c h i a v i [ i ] = " c h i a v e " + ( i + 1 ) ;
}
P a i l l i e r P r i v a t e T h r e s h o l d K e y [ ] keys =
KeyGen . P a i l l i e r T h r e s h o l d K e y L o a d ( S t r k e y s ) ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < keys . l e n g t h ; i ++) {
F i l e W r i t e r F i l e = new F i l e W r i t e r ( c h i a v i [ i ] ) ;
P r i n t W r i t e r o u t =new P r i n t W r i t e r ( F i l e ) ;
o u t . p r i n t l n ( " l : " + l ) ;
o u t . p r i n t l n ( "w: " + w ) ;
o u t . p r i n t l n ( " v : " + keys [ 0 ] . getV ( ) ) ;
o u t . p r i n t l n ( " n : " + keys [ 0 ] . getN ( ) ) ;
o u t . p r i n t l n ( " c o m b i n e S h a r e s C o n s t a n t : "
+ keys [ 0 ] . g e t C o m b i n e S h a r e s C o n s t a n t ( ) ) ;
o u t . p r i n t l n ( " s " + " : " +
keys [ i ] . g e t S i ( ) . t o S t r i n g ( ) ) ;
o u t . p r i n t l n ( " v " + " : " +
keys [ i ] . g e t V i ( ) [ i ] . t o S t r i n g ( ) ) ;
o u t . c l o s e ( ) ;
}
3 ) s p l i t t h e s h a r e s i n k−1 s i z e
4 ) e n c r y p t s h a r e s wi th d s t keys
5 ) t r a n s m i t t h e e n c r y p t e d s h a r e s
AUTHENTICATION PHASE
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1) G e n e r a t i o n o f SS
B i g I n t e g e r [ ] SS = new B i g I n t e g e r [ 1 ] ;
SS=new B i g I n t e g e r ( i n t numBits , Random rnd ) ;
2 ) E n c r y p t SS wi th PU of GA
B i g I n t e g e r e n c r y p t e d S e s s i o n S e c r e t =
A b s t r a c t P a i l l i e r . e n c r y p t ( SS [ 0 ] , r ,
TKeys [ 1 ] . g e t T h r e s h o l d K e y ( ) ) ;
3 ) S p l i t eSS i n t o p i e c e s t o f i t
key d imens ion
4) T r a n s m i s s i o n o f e n c r y p t e d SS ( eSS )
t o v a r i o u s nodes
MTMul t iC l i en t . o b j e c t T r a n s m i t (
8080 , IPofA , eSStoTx ) ;
5 ) C a l c u l a t i o n o f my PDM
P a r t i a l D e c r y p t i o n myPDM=new P a r t i a l D e c r y−
p t i o n ( TKeys [ 0 ] , e n c r y p t e d S e s s i o n S e c r e t ) ;
6 ) S p l i t and e n c r y p t PDM wi th
d s t node P u b l i c KeyGen
B i g I n t e g e r [ ] ePDMBItoP=new Big−
I n t e g e r [ num_of_pdm_cnk ] ;
e s y s . s e t E n c r y p t i o n ( NodePRs [ 1 ] . getPu−
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b l i c K e y ( ) ) ;
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i <num_of_pdm_cnk ; i ++){
ePDMBItoP [ i ]= e s y s . encr−
y p t (PDMBI[ i ] ) ;
}
7 ) T r a n s m i t PDM
MTMul t iC l i en t . o b j e c t T r a n−
s m i t ( 8 0 8 0 , IPofP , ePDMBItoP ) ;
8 ) Pu t my PDM i n r i g h t p o s i t i o n
i n t o t h e rx s t r u c t u r e
pdmc . p u t W i t h P o s i t i o n (myPDM, 1 ) ;
9 ) Wait t o have a l l PDMs rdy
PD=pdmc . g e t ( ) ;
10) Combine PDMs
P a i l l i e r T h r e s h o l d Message = new P a i l−
l i e r T h r e s h o l d ( TKeys [ 0 ] . g e t T h r e s h o l d K e y ( ) ) ;
Message . s e t D e c r y p t E n c r y p t ( TKeys [ 0 ] ) ;
SS=Message . combineSha res (PD)
At this point we can see how the Daemon is constructed for
peripheral nodes. The only difference is that they don’t do the
processing to create SS and the shares, but only wait to receive
them, in order first Shares, then SS, so they calculate their PDM
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and send it to other nodes, waiting with pdmc.get() to receive all
the PDM. Here’s the code
1) S t a r t i n g r e c e i v i n g s e r v e r
Thread t = new Thread ( new ServerHand−
l e r (myPR , pv , sv , pdmc ) , " R e c e i v i n g S e r v e r " ) ;
t . s t a r t ( ) ;
2 ) Wai t i ng h i s s h a r e
PPTK=pv . g e t ( ) ;
3 ) Wai t i ng eSS
SS=sv . g e t ( ) ;
4 ) C a l c u l a t e PDM
P a r t i a l D e c r y p t i o n myPDM=new P a r t i a−
l D e c r y p t i o n ( PPTK , SS ) ;
5 ) Send PDM
6) Wait o t h e r PDMs
7) Combine
After all nodes received PDMs and correctly recover SS they
can use symmetrical encryption with any kind of algorithm work-
ing on the desired length of the generated key.
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4.6 Results
In this section we will first evaluate a theoretical time analisys
and then we’ll show some of the results obtained from the sim-
ulations on the above mentioned framework.
4.6.1 Time analisys
For the first phase, the Phase 0, the time analysis is quite simple,
indeed every node have to broadcast his own public key to the
other n− 1 nodes. It brings the time complexity to be O(n) for
every node, considering the whole system it will raise to O(n2).
The second phase, the Pre-Phase, has same complexity of the
first part of the Phase 0, so time complexity of Pre-Phase is
O(n).
Third phase is similar to Phase 0, so time complexity is O(n) for
the distribution of SS and O(n2) for the whole system to trans-
mit and receive PDMs from the other nodes. This is actually
a good result for a distributed system, allowing the infrastruc-
ture to grow to quite good dimensions with the authentication
process scaling with it in a polynomial time.
4.6.2 Implementation results
In the implementation we misured the time that our nodes used
to process the data and to transmit them around the MANET.
First row of table 4.1 represent the time that 3 nodes need to
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Table 4.1 Processing and Transmission time
Average
3 nodes preprocessing 315,760 ms
5 nodes preprocessing 367,931 ms
SS distribution 185,633 ms
have the shares ready to be used, second row shows the same
parameter but for an implementation with 5 nodes. The third
row instead represent the time it’s needed for the algorithm to
converge, starting when GA creating the Session Secret, ending
when all the nodes have their own copy of decrypted SS. All of
the times in this table are measured through the System.nanotime()
java command, which gives the result in nanoseconds, and it is
rounded to milliseconds to avoid system inaccuracy. Those re-
sults are measured with a distance from nodes of about 5 meters
one from each other.
4.7 Security evaluations
As mentioned in section 3.3.6, we can assume that this al-
gorithm is IND-CCA2 secure, which is the required security
level needed for an asymmetric cryptosystem, it implies that
our system is protected against Outside Attackers (opponents
not belonging to the MANET system). For Inside Attackers in-
stead (Attackers belonging to the MANET but not to the group),
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protection comes from the threshold cryptosystem, in particu-
lar mode, this algorithm gives protection against chosen/adap-
tive cyphertext attacks, and most critical and common ones to a
MANET environment: Replay and Man-in-the-middle attacks.
Protection against first one is well explained in section 4.4.1,
a carefull system of nonce and timestamps avoid the consis-
tency of Replay attacks. For Mitm attacks instead, protection
is granted by the asymmetric encryption of every message ex-
changed in the authentication process.

Chapter 5
Conclusions
At the end of this thesis we can conclude that security is a fun-
damental concept nowadays, therefore it is important to realize
that money and resources spent in information and privacy pro-
tection is not a loss, but an investment instead. The application
realized in this thesis has multiple utilization in different envi-
ronments, not only for MANETs, by the fact it is designed to
face the main IoT concerns. One of the key concepts on which
I based my work, is that the algorithm used in my application
will work in the most scalable and lightweight way possible,
allowing hundreds of devices to authenticate themselves with-
out causing service denial. This has been realized distributing
equally the calculation effort between system nodes. More-
over, this application makes possible the authentication of all
the nodes participating to the group for the whole duration of
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the communication process, not only at the beginning. This
is realized thanks to the Group Activity Check procedure; the
application also distributes a symmetric key to encrypt further
communications, which is simpler than using asymmetric keys
encryption, with almost no security loss. In the end I would like
to conclude this thesis with a reminder from Bruce Schneier,
security responsible for IBM:
“If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you
don’t understand the problems and you don’t understand the
technology.”
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